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tekin@gsu.eduI. Introduction and Background 
  The United States has witnessed a rapid growth in public subsidies for child care 
in the 1990s.  This trend has become even more pronounced since the passage of welfare 
reform in 1996, which aimed at reducing welfare dependence and increasing 
employment.  In order to reach this goal, the government increased child care funding 
substantially, and eliminated the fragmentation in the child care system by consolidating 
the previously existing four main child care funding streams into a single block grant, 
called the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF).  In 1999, child care subsidies were 
estimated to be around $21 billion (Blau 2001).  Today, child care subsidies are 
considered an integral part of the government efforts to help low income families support 
themselves by work rather than welfare as well as to support the development of low-
income children. 
  Because child care subsidies are often argued on the basis of increasing 
employment, majority of the subsidies are in programs with strong employment 
requirements.
1  While placing restrictions on the use of subsidies with respect to the 
employment dimension, the current child care system places a high priority on 
maximizing parental choice with respect to the quality or the type of care chosen.  The 
vast majority of subsidies are distributed through vouchers that parents can use for any 
legal child care provider, including relatives, in-home caregivers, family child care 
homes, or centers (Blau 2003, Adams and Rohacek 2002).  About 90% of children served 
by CCDF subsidies in 2000 were served through voucher-based funding, which parents 
could use in any of the setting listed above (Adams and Rohacek 2002). Child care 
                                                 
1 One exception is Head Start, which is designed to support the development of low-income children 
specifically.  Its goal is to subsidize high-quality care and it has no employment or training requirement. 
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 providers must be licensed if state law requires it.  If they are exempt from the licensing 
requirement, they must meet basic health and safety standards.  The regulations are 
determined entirely by states. Although states can impose more stringent requirements, 
these requirements must continue to accommodate maximum parental choice.   
  This paper provides evidence on the impact of the actual child care subsidy 
receipt on the joint employment and child care mode decisions of single mothers in the 
post-welfare reform period.  The child care choices are categorized into four modes: 
centers, family day care homes, relatives, and parental care.  This is the first paper to 
examine the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the joint employment and child care 
mode decisions of single mothers of young children. 
  The evidence of the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the behavior of mothers of 
young children is limited, mainly because of lack of data on child care subsidies. There 
are only four studies examining the impact of actual subsidy receipt on the employment 
decision of mothers and none of them considers the demand for specific child care 
modes. Meyers, Heintze, and Wolf (2002) examine the impact of subsidy receipt on 
employment of low-income single mothers in California.  Gelbach (2002) estimates the 
effect of the availability of free kindergarten on employment of mothers of five-year old 
children. Berger and Black (1992) investigate the impact of two Kentucky child care 
subsidy programs on employment of low-income single mothers. Blau and Tekin (2003) 
separately estimate the effects of child care subsidy receipt on the employment, welfare, 
unemployment, and schooling outcomes of single mothers using data from the National 
Survey of America’s Families.  All of these studies find a positive effect of subsidy 
receipt on the employment decision of mothers.  There is also a large number of studies 
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 examining the impact of child care prices on employment and child care mode decisions 
of mothers, motivated mainly to infer how child care subsidies would affect behavior.
2  
However, the price or fee effect may not be a proper measure of the child care subsidy 
effect if there are substantial costs to taking up a subsidy, such as the stigma of 
participating in a means-tested program (Blau 2003).   
  Most of the literature on the impact of child care costs on employment and child 
care choice decisions focuses on married mothers. Another common characteristic of the 
previous studies is that, with the exception of Blau and Tekin (2003), they use data from 
the pre-welfare reform period.  However, the results from the pre-reform studies may not 
be a reliable guide to the current subsidy effects because of the substantial changes put in 
place to the child care system by welfare reform (Blau 2003).   
II. Data and Methodology 
  This study uses data from the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families 
(NSAF).  The NSAF sample is a representative of the United States population under age 
65.  Residents of the 13 states and households with income less than 200 percent of the 
federal poverty line are over-sampled.
3 The subsidy receipt variable is constructed from 
the answers to the question of whether the mother receives any assistance paying for 
child care, including assistance from a welfare or social services agency.  The NSAF also 
provides detailed information on the primary child care arrangement in which the child 
                                                 
2 For example, Anderson and Levine (2000), Connelly and Kimmel (1999), Kimmel (1995, 1998), Ribar 
(1992, 1995), Blau and Robins (1998), Powell (1997, 1998) focus on the employment outcome. Leibowitz, 
Waite, and Witsberger (1988), Lehrer (1989), Hofferth and Wissoker (1992), Cleveland and Hyatt (1993), 
Chaplin et al. (1999), and Connelly and Kimmel (2000) estimate models of the demand for specific modes 
of child care.  However, only three studies, Blau and Hagy (1998), Powell (2002), and Michalopoulos and 
Robins (2002) examine the joint employment and child care mode decisions. 
3 These 13 are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. They contain more than half of the U.S. 
population. 
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 spends the most number of hours each week.
4  To be consistent with the literature, the 
choice of child care mode is collapsed into four categories: center care, family day care, 
relative care, and parental care.
5 One-hundred-thirty-four mothers who reported working 
while providing parental care for their children are excluded from the sample.  This 
exclusion is grounded on the basis that very few single mothers will have that option 
available to them and one would expect their decision-making regarding employment and 
child care choices to differ from those who do not have that option (Powell 2002).
6 After 
applying these criteria, the sample used in the analysis contains 2,226 single mothers with 
at least one child under the age of 6.  Definitions and descriptive statistics for variables 
are displayed in Table 1. About 35 percent of the sample (766 mothers) use parental care.  
Among working mothers, 38 percent (551 mothers) use center care, 21 percent (305 
mothers) use family day care, and 41 percent (584 mothers) use relative care.  About 17 
percent of the mothers in the sample report receiving a child care subsidy.  The 
Administration for Children and Families (2000) predicts that about 12-15 percent of all 
eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998-2000.  However, the national figure 
includes all children under age 13 whereas the sample used in this paper contains only 
                                                 
4 In the NSAF, child care information is collected for up to two randomly chosen children, one between 
ages 0-5 and the other between ages 6-12.  They are called focal children in the NSAF.  Most of other 
studies use arrangement for the youngest child in each of these age categories because this is what is 
provided in their data.  
5 Family day care includes non-relative care in child’s home (e.g. care by a baby-sitter) or out of child’s 
home. This is the typical classification used in previous studies.   
6 There are 72 mothers whose children are enrolled in Head Start. 26 of them reported receiving a subsidy.  
These 26 mothers are classified here as subsidy recipients because it is not possible to determine from the 
data whether these cases receive an employment-related child care subsidy in addition to Head Start.  
Estimation of the models with these cases reclassified as not receiving a subsidy produced similar results. 
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 children under age 6. Thus, the subsidy coverage in the sample is not unreasonable.  
Other statistics are also consistent with those usually reported in other studies.
7
  A cross-classification of the four modes with the binary employment decision 
results in a multinomial choice model with following four alternatives: (1) mother does 
not work and therefore does not use non-maternal care, (2) mother works and uses center 
care, (3) mother works and uses family day care, and (4) mother works and uses relative 
care.  Assume that the utility of the i
th mother if she chooses alternative j is given by 
 V ij = Xiβj + αjSi  + εij,   j=1,…..,4,    i  =  1,…..,N    (1) 
where Xi is a vector of observed characteristics of the mother i such as age, nonwage 
income, health status, race, ethnicity, region of residence, number of children in different 
age groups, education, and immigration status.  Si is a binary indicator of subsidy receipt, 
εij is an alternative specific disturbance, and β and α are the parameters to be estimated.  
It must be noted that a structural model would normally include the wage rate.  However, 
the determinants of the wage rate are substituted into equation (1) since wage effect is not 
the focus of this paper.  Thus, equation (1) is really a quasi-reduced form model. 
  According to (1), the mother i will choose alternative j if Vij > Vik for all k≠ j. 
Assuming that the ε’s are drawn from independent extreme-value distributions, equation 
(1) can be estimated using a multinomial logit model.  However, the coefficient estimate 
on the subsidy receipt is likely to be biased due to endogeneity for several reasons.  For 
example, mothers with strong preferences for work (alternatives 2-4) may be more 
motivated to seek a child care subsidy. Alternatively, mothers with the least employment 
                                                 
7 It turns out that every single mother has at least one relative present in the household since the variable, 
the number of relatives, has a range from 1 to 11 in the sample. This supports the inclusion of relative care 
as an alternative in the multinomial choice model.  However, for estimation purposes, it is not crucial that 
every mother has the option of relative care because the choice set for those who do not have that option 
could be reduced to the first three alternatives in that case.  
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 qualifications may be given priority for subsidies by administrators.  Therefore, the 
estimation of a binary model of child care subsidy receipt is necessary to account for 
possible bias that would contaminate the actual impact of subsidies on the behavior of 
single mothers.  A subsidy receipt equation can be specified as follows: 
   Si = Xiδ+ Ziζ + υi,          ( 2 )  
where Zi is a vector of identifying instruments, and υi is a disturbance with mean zero.  Zi 
includes the percent of eligible children served by child care subsidies in the state, the 
average amount of CCDF funds spent per child in the state, and a binary variable 
indicating whether the state uses mass media as a consumer education strategy for the 
child care subsidies.  These variables are assumed to affect whether a single mother 
receives a child care subsidy or not, but they have no impact on her employment or child 
care mode decisions.  
  The estimation of equation (1) with a multinomial logit model may be 
problematic because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, which 
imposes the error terms, εij‘s, to be independent across alternatives. For example, if a 
mother has unobserved preferences for work, these preferences will appear in all the 
alternatives (2-4) in which the mother is employed.  It is likely, for example, that the 
decision to work while using center care is closely related to the decision to work while 
using family day care.  With the exception of Blau and Hagy (1998), all of the previous 
studies that estimate a multinomial logit model failed to guard against this potential 
problem, mainly due to computational difficulty.
8 Following Blau and Hagy (1998), a 
                                                 
8 These include Blau and Robins (1988), Hoffeth and Wissoker (1992), Cleveland and Hyatt (1993), 
Chaplin et al. (1999), Michalopoulos and Robins (2000), and Connelly and Kimmel (2000), and owell 
(2002). In this group, only Powell (2002) and Chaplin et al. (2000) implement a Hausman Test to test the 
validity of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. 
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 discrete random effects specification is used in this paper to allow for the possibility of 
correlation in the disturbances across the discrete alternatives.  Furthermore, the subsidy 
receipt equation is estimated jointly with the multinomial choice equation to allow for the 
possibility of correlation between εij‘s and υi.
9  To implement the discrete random effects 
specification, the following factor structure is imposed on the disturbances in equations 
(1) and (2): 
  εij = uij + ρjη,           ( 3 )  
  
   υi = µi + ρsη,             ( 4 )  
where uij, µi, and η are mutually independent disturbances, the ρ’s are factor loadings that 
allow for flexibility in the effect of a given factor across equations.  This structure places 
the restriction that all correlation across error terms enters the model through the common 
factor η that is assumed to have a discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer1984).  
Specifically, 





k 1   p
Where θk is the k
th point of support in the distribution of η, pk is the probability that the η 
takes on the value of θk, and K is the number of points in the support of the distribution of 
η.  This assumption is much less restrictive than the common practice of specifying a 
functional form of the distribution of the η’s.  Under these specifications, the likelihood 
function contribution for mother i associated with equations (1) and (2) is given by 
 L i =           ( 5 )   ). θ   |   1 Pr(S   ) (θ Pr   p k
K
1 k
i k ij k ∑
=
=
                                                 
9 Mroz (1999) finds that this discrete random effects specification is more robust to deviations from 
normality and quality of instruments than two-stage methods.  See Mocan and Tekin (2003), Picone et al. 
(2003), and Hu (1999) for other examples of this method. 
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 Assuming that the uij‘s in equation (3) are drawn from independent extreme-value 
distributions, Prij(θk) = 
i ψ
η) ρ     S α     β exp(X   j i j j i + +





c i c c i η) ρ     S α     β exp(X 1 
and α1 set to zero for identification.
10  Specifying a logit for the binary subsidy receipt 
equation, one gets Pr(Si = 1| θk) = 
η) ρ        Zi   exp(X   1
η) ρ        Zi   exp(X
s   i





.   The parameters to be 
estimated in the model are β’s, α, ζ’s, δ’s. θ’s, and p’s. 
III. Results  
  The results of the child care subsidy receipt model are presented in Table 2.
11  The 
marginal effects of the logit coefficients are displayed in the first column and the 
underlying coefficients are displayed in the second column.  The standard errors are 
presented in the third column.  Single mothers with a high school and some college 
degree are 7.6 and 11.4 percentage points more likely to receive a child care subsidy than 
others.  Black are more likely to receive a subsidy than whites and other races.  Those 
living in the West and Midwest are more likely to receive a subsidy than those living in 
the South or Northeast.  Mothers who were born in the U.S. are 5.1 percentage points 
                                                 













, where k=2,…..,K-1, 






exp(f   1
) exp(f
,  k=1,…K-1, 




k) exp(f   1
1
, where the fk’s are parameters to be estimated. See Blau and Hagy (1998) for a 
similar implementation. 
11 The models are estimated with different points of support (K).  The results presented in the paper are 
taken from a model with five points of support. A model with six points of support did not improve the 
likelihood function value significantly and the results were very similar.  The estimated factor loadings and 
heterogeneity parameters are presented in Table 5.  As Table 5 illustrates, most of these estimates are 
statistically significant.  
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 more likely to receive a subsidy than others. Higher non-wage income reduces the 
likelihood of subsidy receipt, but the estimated effect is small. A 1,000 increase in non-
wage income would induce about a 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
subsidy receipt.  The presence of an additional relative in household reduces the 
likelihood of subsidy receipt by about 2 percentage points.  
  Each of three identifying instruments is a significant determinant of the first stage 
outcome, the probability of subsidy receipt.  State’s use of mass media as a consumer 
education strategy is associated with a 4.7 percentage increase in the likelihood of 
subsidy receipt. A one percentage increase in the percent of eligible children served in the 
state increases the likelihood of child care subsidy receipt by about 0.4 percentage points.  
Finally, a 1,000 dollar increase in the annual amount of CCDF funds spent per child 
increases the likelihood of subsidy receipt by about 1.3 percentage points.  The three 
estimates are statistically significant individually.  Furthermore, a specification test 
rejected that they are jointly zero at less than 0.001 level of significance.  In order to 
support further evidence on the validity of the instruments, they were included in the 
second stage multinomial choice model.  Most of the nine coefficients of these three 
variables are found to be insignificant and a specification test failed to reject the 
hypothesis that they are jointly zero. 
  Results of the multinomial choice model are displayed in Table 3 and the 
corresponding marginal effects are presented in Table 4.
12   The effects of explanatory 
                                                 
12 For binary variables, the marginal effects are calculated for each mother as the difference of the 
probability of choosing a particular alternative when the binary variable equals 1 and the probability of 
choosing that alternative when the binary variable is 0.  Since the probability of choosing an alternative i, 
Pr(i), is a function of the heterogeneity parameters, each probability is integrated over the heterogeneity 
distribution.  These values are then averaged over the sample.  The marginal effect for the continuous 
variables is, βPr(i)[1-Pr(i)], which is again calculated for each mother, integrating over the heterogeneity 
distribution.  This is again averaged over the sample. 
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 variables are mostly as expected.  Nonwage income has a small but negative impact on 
employment, indicating that leisure is a normal good. Having an additional child under 
age 5 lowers the probability of work by 10 percentage points.  A similar pattern is 
observed for the impact of older children, although the magnitude is smaller.  Education 
also appears to be an important factor explaining the choices of work and child care.  
Better educated single mothers are much more likely to work and use formal child care 
arrangements like center care and family day care.   
  As illustrated in Table 4, child care subsidy receipt increases the probability of 
choosing alternatives in which the mother is employed (alternatives 2-4) by a total of 
15.3 percentage points.  This result is consistent with the economic theory because child 
care subsidy receipt effectively reduces the size of an important work-related expense, 
child care costs.  Based on the marginal effects of subsidy receipt for alternatives (2)-(4), 
it is also clear that the receipt of subsidies are overwhelmingly used for center care by the 
employed mothers.  Not only non-employed mothers are moving from parental care to 
employment and center care, a sizeable proportion of employed single mothers are 
moving from relative care to center care when they receive child care subsidies.  
Specifically, subsidy receipt increases the probability of working and using center care by 
33.2 percentage points while decreasing the probability of working and using relative 
care by 16.2 percentage points.  The finding that child care subsidies decrease the use of 
parental care is consistent with other studies (e.g. Michalopoulos and Robins 2000, 
Powell 2002, Hofferth and Wissoker 1992, and Michalopoulos et al. 1992).  The overall 
impact on employment and on using family day care is negative but small in magnitude.  
These results may suggest that single mothers perceive center care of better quality than 
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 either family day care centers or relative care.  Alternatively they may be switching to 
center care in order to release relatives from the child care requirement if relatives divide 
their time between leisure and child care (Blau and Tekin 2003).  Also, the potentially 
constrained size of the “relative market” may play a role in the use of such care compared 
with the potential size of the market for center care (Powell 2002).  In fact, controlling for 
subsidy receipt, the number of relatives in the household has a significant and positive 
effect on the probability of choosing relative care. 
IV. Conclusion 
  Based on the significant and sizeable effect of subsidy receipt on employment, 
results presented in this paper support the view that child care subsidies are instrumental 
in helping welfare reform reach its goal of increased employed.  Results also indicate that 
the increase in employment will likely to involve a substantial move away from relative 
care toward center-based care.  If one believes that parental or relative care has higher 
quality than nonparental market care, these findings may seem troublesome.  
Michalopoulos et al. (1992) argue that subsidies would encourage mothers to work, but 
they would replace high-quality parental care with potentially low-quality nonparental 
care.  However, there is little evidence about the relative merits for the child of different 
types of care.
13 Given the current policy of encouraging mothers to enter the workforce, 
women have little choice but to use non-maternal care.   
                                                 
13 On one hand, a positive parenting style characterized by warm, supportive interaction between parent 
and child may have favorable effects on child’s development (Campbell 1995, Landy and Tam 1996). 
Some psychologists argue that appropriate care requires that the mother should provide primary care until 
the child reaches the age of 3 (White 1975).  However, one cannot be sure that a child receives adequate 
care without the knowledge about the actual dynamics of the relationship between children and parents in 
the sample. On the other hand, children, especially those aged 3-5, may benefit from interaction with other 
children and with an adult trained in early childhood education (Berk 1985). Also, center care is often 
argued to be of better quality and more reliable than relative care and parental care since relative and 
parental care are largely to be custodial (Kimmel 1994). 
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Mother receives a child care subsidy  0.166  0.103  0.347  0.148  0.089 
 (0.372)  (0.304)  (0.476)  (0.355)  (0.285) 
Mother works  0.653  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
  (0.476)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  
Mother’s age  28.868  28.379  29.552  29.852  28.349 
 (6.511)  (6.622)  (6.153)  (6.495)  (6.601) 
Mother has less than a high school degree
a 0.162 0.291 0.073  0.085  0.116 
 (0.368)  (0.455)  (0.260)  (0.280)  (0.321) 
Mother has a high school degree  0.388  0.372  0.370  0.387  0.426 
 (0.487)  (0.484)  (0.483)  (0.488)  (0.495) 
Mother has some college degree  0.350  0.285  0.430  0.374  0.346 
 (0.477)  (0.452)  (0.496)  (0.485)  (0.476) 
Mother has a bachelor degree or more  0.101  0.052  0.127  0.154  0.111 
 (0.301)  (0.223)  (0.333)  (0.362)  (0.315) 
Mother resides in Northeast 
a 0.237 0.281 0.218  0.233  0.199 
 (0.425)  (0.450)  (0.413)  (0.423)  (0.399) 
Mother resides in Midwest 0.276  0.192  0.272  0.328  0.363 
 (0.447)  (0.394)  (0.446)  (0.470)  (0.481) 
Mother resides in South 0.286  0.312  0.312  0.207  0.271 
 (0.452)  (0.464)  (0.464)  (0.406)  (0.445) 
Mother resides in West 0.201  0.215  0.198  0.233  0.168 
 (0.401)  (0.411)  (0.399)  (0.423)  (0.374) 
Mother is black  0.326  0.328  0.376  0.220  0.332 
 (0.469)  (0.470)  (0.485)  (0.415)  (0.471) 
Mother is white  0.640  0.634  0.597  0.754  0.627 
 (0.480)  (0.482)  (0.491)  (0.431)  (0.484) 
Mother is of other race 
a 0.034 0.038 0.027  0.026  0.041 
 (0.182)  (0.191)  (0.163)  (0.160)  (0.199) 
Mother is of Hispanic ethnicity 0.187  0.255  0.105  0.154  0.193 
 (0.390)  (0.436)  (0.307)  (0.362)  (0.395) 
Mother was born in the US  0.898  0.856  0.936  0.918  0.906 
 (0.303)  (0.351)  (0.244)  (0.275)  (0.292) 
Mother is in good health  0.840  0.757  0.880  0.895  0.882 
 (0.367)  (0.429)  (0.325)  (0.307)  (0.323) 
Number or relatives in household  2.547  2.812  2.198  2.289  2.664 
 (1.436)  (1.536)  (1.150)  (1.162)  (1.579) 
Number of children between ages 0-5   1.299  1.427  1.203  1.210  1.267 
in household  (0.589)  (0.704)  (0.481)  (0.461)  (0.547) 
Number of children between ages 6-13   0.786  0.915  0.628  0.741  0.788 
in household  (0.998)  (1.095)  (0.832)  (0.897)  (1.038) 
Nonwage income (/1,000) 2.700  2.635  2.667  2.709  2.809 
 (6.630)  (7.315)  (6.605)  (5.182)  (6.390) 
Percentage of eligible children served   0.117  0.119  0.117  0.114  0.115 
by child care subsidies in state (/100) 
b (0.042) (0.040) (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
State uses mass media as an education  0.715  0.727  0.731  0.721  0.682 
strategy for child care subsidies
 b (0.451) (0.446) (0.444)  (0.449)  (0.466) 
Amount of CCDF funds spent per child  0.529  0.512  0.532  0.547  0.541 
by the state (/10,000)
 b (0.185) (0.175) (0.172)  (0.200)  (0.198) 
Number of observations  2206  766  551  305  584 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
a Omitted category. 
b Source: Child Care Bureau. Nonwage 
income includes all income during 1999 except the mother’s earnings and income means-tested programs.    














Mother’s age  -0.006 -0.048 0.010 
Age squared (/1,000)   0.019  0.151  0.165 
Mother has a high school degree  0.076*** 0.593  0.026 
Mother has some college degree  0.114*** 0.857  0.029 
Mother has a bachelor degree or more  -0.027 -0.254 0.035 
Mother is white  0.030 0.252  0.042 
Mother is black  0.136** 0.987  0.057 
Mother is of Hispanic ethnicity  -0.009 -0.092 0.022 
Mother is in good health  -0.029 -0.247 0.022 
Number of children between ages 0-5   0.034** 0.269  0.015 
in household      
Number of children between ages 6-13   0.032*** 0.258  0.012 
in household      
Mother resides in South  0.015 0.117  0.028 
Mother resides in West  0.122*** 0.843  0.035 
Mother resides in Midwest  0.065** 0.479  0.027 
Mother was born in the US  0.051** 0.444  0.024 
Nonwage income (/1,000)  -0.005*** -0.084  0.002 
Number of relatives in household  -0.017* -0.139  0.009 
Percentage of eligible children served   0.391* 3.229 0.206 
by child care subsidies in state (/100)      
State uses mass media as an education 







Amount of CCDF funds spent per child  0.128*** 1.056  0.047 
by the state (/10,000)       
Constant   -3.465  1.401 
Log Likelihood  -3,554     
Number of observations  2,206    
Note: *, **, and *** indicate that the marginal effect is statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 















Subsidy receipt  1.744 ***  0.561**  -0.187* 
 (0.177)  (0.222)  (0.105) 
Mother’s age  0.050***  0.038***  0.004 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
Mother has a high school degree  1.117***  1.088***  1.059*** 
 (0.216)  (0.255)  (0.183) 
Mother has some college degree  1.402***  1.216***  1.057*** 
 (0.223)  (0.264)  (0.194) 
Mother has a bachelor degree or more  2.025***  1.994***  1.695*** 
 (0.287)  (0.329)  (0.269) 
Mother is white  0.288  0.632  -0.073 
 (0.371)  (0.448)  (0.320) 
Mother is black  0.542  0.294  -0.172 
 (0.391)  (0.476)  (0.339) 
Mother is of Hispanic ethnicity  -0.620*** -0.303  0.157 
  (0.203) (0.227)  (0.171) 
Mother is in good health  0.792*** 0.880***  0.792*** 
  (0.178) (0.221)  (0.167) 
Number of children between ages 0-5   -0.579*** -0.422***  -0.576*** 
in household  (0.144) (0.172)  (0.122) 
Number of children between ages      







Mother resides in South  0.369** -0.107 0.265* 
  (0.171) (0.213)  (0.157) 
Mother resides in West  0.262 0.291  0.259 
 (0.194)  (0.222)  (0.188) 
Mother resides in Midwest  0.675***  0.858***  1.262*** 
 (0.190)  (0.220)  (0.188) 
Mother was born in the US  0.262  0.243  0.296 
 (0.256)  (0.288)  (0.218) 
Nonwage income (/1,000)  -0.019* -0.025*  -0.019* 
  (0.011) (0.014)  (0.012) 
Number of relatives in household  -0.058 -0.081  0.216*** 
  (0.078) (0.094)  (0.065) 
Constant  -2.639*** -3.060***  -1.477*** 
  (0.630) (0.741)  (0.573) 
Log Likelihood  -3,554     
Number of observations  2,206     
Note: *, **, and *** represent statistical statistically significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
















Mother receives a child care subsidy  -0.153  0.332  -0.017  -0.162 
Mother’s age  -0.005  0.007  0.002  -0.003 
Mother has a high school degree  -0.184  0.077  0.035  0.073 
Mother has some college degree  -0.205  0.124  0.037  0.045 
Mother has a bachelor degree or more  -0.276  0.144  0.069  0.062 
Mother is white  -0.034  0.031  0.054  -0.050 
Mother is black  -0.059  0.070  0.004  -0.015 
Mother is of Hispanic ethnicity 0.034  -0.094  -0.016  0.077 
Mother is in good health  -0.150 0.055  0.036  0.060 
Number of children between ages 0-5   0.099 -0.045  -0.006  -0.047 
in household        
Number of children between ages 6-13  0.052 -0.036  0.011  -0.025 
in household        
Mother resides in South  -0.041 0.048  -0.033  0.026 
Mother resides in West  -0.047 0.018  0.011  0.018 
Mother resides in Midwest  -0.157 -0.017  0.013  0.162 
Mother was born in the US  -0.049 0.017  0.006  0.026 
Nonwage income (/1,000)  0.003 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
Number of relatives in household  -0.012  -0.021  -0.013  0.046 
Log Likelihood  -3,554       



















   p 1 0.507
ρ2 2.010*** 0.247  f1 1.462*** 0.086   p2 0.169
ρ3 1.909*** 0.348  f2 0.365 0.378    p3 0.025
ρ4 1.780*** 0.263  f3 -1.543* 0.961    p4 0.182
ρs 0.967** 0.461  f4 0.438 0.405    p5 0.117
          
 
Points of Support 
   g 2 0.199*** 0.026   Θ1 -1.425
   g 3 0.212*** 0.052   Θ2 0.141
   g 4 0.183*** 0.024   Θ3 0.150
           Θ4 0.130
   r  2.850  0.177    Θ5 1.425
Note: ρ1 is set equal to zero for identification. *, **, and *** represent statistical statistically significance at 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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